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In cgration of a Fire Detector into a Spacecraft 
R. M. F. LINFOHn* 
McDmmcl/ DOl/g las CorporatioJl, St. Lollis, Mo. 
:\ ddec(nr scnsil iYe 10 only the ullr.H'iolet 'r:ldiation emitted by llames has heen sdec!ed as the basic clement 
of tb,' :'\:\S :\ Skyl:lh lire detl'etion system. It is sel i~itive to approximatl'ly 10- "\V of radi;ltion :lnd will 
detect ~NllWNN! llames a t rl ist:lllees in excess of 3m. The performance of thc dcteetor was veri lied hy experiments in 
:In ai rn:lft lfyi n~ zcroJ~rWfyD i ty pamholas 10 simulate the ehar:Jeterislies of a fire which thc detector muM sense. 
£ :"I.ll'nsin' iun'sligat ion ;lIId cxactin~ design was necessary to e:"l.cillde all pEl!>..~ihle sources.. of false alarms. 
Oplical mca~lfrefylCylts were made on all the spaeeer.lft windows to determine the amount of solar radiation 
Ir:msm il: ,'d. The li~hti n~ systems and the onbo;ud experiments also were appraised for ultraviolet emissions. 
Pro!n\l-acee!cr;ltor tests werc performed iO detcrmine the interaction of thc Earth's trapped radiation belts 
wilh the detectors and the design of the instrument was modified to negate these effects. 
Introduction 
ALTHOUG H nrc detectors have been deployed in commer-
r~cial and military a ircraft fo r some years, the NASA Skylab 
will be the fjr~t U.S. spac..: vehicle to be equipped with a fire 
detection syst..:m. Th..: ,\ po ll o Slxlc..:craft fi re emphasized 
the need fo r such systems and the NASA Fi re Haza rd Steering 
Committee in itialeu preliminary developments in this area. 
the cabin atmosphere was rejected as the Sky Jab air circulation 
could delay the response of such systems with disastrous 
consequences. Sampling detectors were also eliminated 
becausc of their inability to identify the exact location of a 
fire . Correlation spectrometer/interferometers are being 
developed to scan large volumes, but the development 
program for such an instrument was incompatible with the 
Skylab launch schedule. Continuous wire thermistors are 
used extensively to sense fires in aircra ft-cn gi ne nacelles. 
An extremely complicated network of thermistor or thermo-
couples would have been required for adequate coverage of 
the Skylab system. rnfra red detectors have often been used 
in spacecraft optical systems but are relatively unproven for 
fire detection. Furthermore, they are liable to false alarms 
from hot objects and are insensitive to low-pressure flames. 
This paper describes the development of the Skyla b fi re 
detection sensor and the experimen ts undertaken to verify 
its cap~lbili t ics. The ra tionale fo r the selection of an ul tra-
violet detector is described and a description of the detector 
tube is included. Experiments on zero-gravity combustion, 
proton rad iation cfT.::cts and the ultraviolet radiation back-
ground are also d iscussed. 
Selection of the Ultraviolet Sensor 
The fire detection systems tha t were considered for the 
Sky lab included the devices listed in Table 1. For this 
particular appl ica tion any device tha t would rely on sampling 
All flames emit ultraviolet radiation and extremely sensitive 
detectors are available for this spectral region. Although 
these detectors respond only to an open flame, their sensitivity 
is such that the small flames which they will detect, if extin-
guished promptly, should not threaten the safety of the Sky lab 
crew. The wavelength range of operation of the ultraviolet 
Table 1 Firc-deteetion devices considered for Sky lab 
Category Type of detector Parameter detected 
Optical Ultraviolet UV radiation from flame 
Infrared IR radiation from fire 
Chemical Laser scattering Smoke 
Correlation spectrometer Gaseous combustion products 
Condensation nuclei counter Smoke 
Ion counter Smoke 
Thermal Continuous wire thermistor Heat 
Thermocouple Heat 
Physic:tl Prcssure Increase in cabin pressure 
Comments 
Proven; volume 
surveillance 
Unproven ; volume 
surveillance 
Required development; 
sampling 
Required development; 
sampling 
Frequent maintenance; 
saml,ling 
Liable to false alarm; 
sampling 
Requires complic:lted 
wiring for volume 
coverage 
Requircs complicated 
wiring for volume 
coverage 
Very insensitive 
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detectors is b.:i,)\\" 300 nm ; therdore, they are "blind" to 
NNNM~t l)f th' b.ldD !~ f .. )unu rad iation sources in th.: Skybb, such 
as the li~htWJI the crew. ~cicn t l li~D in~trllllNcntsI and, for the most 
part, thc sobr r:ld i;l. i,1l1 penetrating the sp:lcecraft windows. 
cal~e :11,11111$ Call1H'1 be tl)ler,ltcd, so thi~ lack of response to 
badq;r .. 111nd !>l111 rc .. ·s \\'as an intlllellcing factor in the tinal 
choice of the lIltra\iokl detectors. The e detectors have been 
widely lIsed in tire u.:te.:tor systems for aircraft, on bunch 
pads, in :1l1l0Ilhlti\'c ~ystemsI in hC;lling systems, and in many 
experimental fa.:il ities. 
lJlt r:lYiolct Detector Tube 
The llIhc is ()i the Cici W;crJ~ III 'llcr type I and consists of two 
par;llkl pbtc clectr,1(ks ill a gas-tilled. ultraviolet-transmitting 
glass cnvck)!,c. Ultraviolet radiation incident upon the tube 
r.:leases photocleclrons from the metal cathode triggering an 
avalanche ionization process. Each time th is ionization is 
triggered by :In incident ultr:lviolet photon, the conductivity 
of the tube rises rapidy, and a voltag.:: pulse is generated at the 
output. The frequency of these pulses is used to indicate the 
presence of a fin:. 
Only photons of a certain minimum energy (maximum 
wavekngth) will liberate cI.::ctrons from the photocathode. 
With the metallic cathode material used in the Honeywell 
detector the upper wavelength limit is about 260 nm, while 
absorption of r:ldiation by :ltl11ospheric oxygen results in a 
180 nm lower limit. A typical calibration curve for one of 
these sensors is shown in Fig. 1, in which the countrate per 
unit energy density (counts sec-I picowatt- ' cm2) is plotted 
ag:linst the wavelength. This curve demonstrates the sen-
sitivity of the sensor. In th.:: 190-240 nm range approximately 
50 counts are gener:lted by I picowatt cm -2 of incident 
radiation. Although the quantu m efficiency of the cathode 
at these w:lvc\cnglhs is ,,;. ,he order of 0.01 %, the avalanche 
mechanism ensun:s that a high percentage of the liberated 
electrons is detected. Furthermore, the number of false counts 
due to thermal activation and background visible radiation 
is essentially zero. Few quantitative measurements have 
been made of the spectral radiance of fires at these wavelengths 
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Fi;:. 1 Spectr:11 catibration of the I foneywell fire-<ictcctor tube. 
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Fig.2 Sp('ctrom('tl'r fllIlplit dllrillgl.sc:m of a ml·thanc/ai r flame. 
(Figure fl'prndllccd hy J)I.'rmissiun of Iioneywcll, Inc.) 
but the curve in Fig. 2 is representative of many hydrocarbon 
fires. Molecular emissions are apparent in the 185-260 nm 
band, but these are two orders of magnitude less intense than 
the familiar 306.8 nm OH bands. Such weak emissions must 
be detected by the fire sensors across the large volumes of the 
Orbital Workshop module of the Skylab. In such extreme 
situations, the fire could be further than 3 m from the nearest 
possible sensor installation; however, the ultraviolet detector 
tube has been proven to be more than adequate for the task. 
Detection Capability 
An alarm threshold had to be established for the Sky lab 
detectors. This threshold determined the sensitivity of the 
detection system, or, more importantly, the size to which a 
flame must grow before it could be detected . Moreover, the 
threshold had to be set high enough to preclude the incidence 
of false alarms. 
A prediction of the detection capability from the known 
spectral calibr.ttion curve of the detector tube was rendered 
impossible by a complete lack of srectral radiance data for 
fircs at applicable wavelengths. Further, any slIch data 
obtained in tlte laboratory under normal gravitational 
conditions would inadequately represent a fire burning in the 
low-pressure, oxygen-rich , zero-gravity environment of the 
Skylab. Convection currents are established around Earth-
bound fires maintaining supplies of fresh oxygen to the fbmes; 
under zero-gravity condition there will be no natural convec-
tion around the flame, and fires can be expected to burn less 
fiercely?') Some convection will be maintained by the 
Skylab ventilation systems in the crew-living areas but several 
of the fire detectors will monitor enclosed compartments 
through which air is not circulated. 
To evaluate the performance of the Skylab detector, a 
series of experiments was undertaken in which a detector tube 
Fused·Silica 
Window 
Neutrat 
Fig. 3 Combustion chamber llnd optical transfer system for the 
zero-lVIlvityexperiments. 
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Fig. 4 Comhustion of photographic film in zero-grm·ity. 
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monitored various small fires hurning in zero-gravity." Small 
samples of a wide va riety of sraceer~lft materials were burned 
in a combustion ch;unbcr IIlied with the 5 rsi oxygen-nitrogen 
atmosphere of the Skylab. Two detector tubes were installed 
so that they viewed the fires through the transfer optics 
illustrated in Fig. 3, as the combustion was recorded on 16 mOl 
color movie film. The neutral filter was installed to attenuate 
the radiation and thus simulate a 3 m fire-to·detector separa-
tion. 
To generate the weightless environment. the chamber was 
released to free-float in the cabin of an USAF C-135 aircraft 
flying a pa r:lholic trajectory. During this maneuver 15 or 
20 SI!C of frl!e-tloat timl! wa~ availahle. 
Exampl.::- of the photogra ph .. and data obtained during the 
cXpCrillll!nh ;Ifl! illu~trated in Fi !,!s. 4 and 5. The n;lI11e 
photEFgraph~ illu:- trate the ulllque chara':leristics of /.ero-
gravity flames : the spherical name gl\lwth and the self-
extinction of thl! fires by the combustion products. Detector-
output curves emphasize thl! brief nature of the lire compared 
with a one-gravity burn. Nevertheless, the signals generated 
Elapsed Time · sec 
Fig. 5 Detector outputs during the comhustion of photo~r.lphie 
lilm in zero·gravity. 
in the detector tuocs during every combustion cy.:I' t 1' .. 1 
" n I C S UlICu, 
Slgl1l IGlIlt Y exceeded 35 counts/sec. This h:vcl was suo. 
sequently set.:cted as Ihe alarlll Ilue ... hold after the fal ... e al ' 
I· I .\ I I .. Irm stUl les l escn 'lCl 1'lC ow. Throughout the exrcriments. not 
one of the names exceeded 4 cm in diam. and yet they all 
~o~l.d have occn detected from 3 m. within a second or two of 
11;llItlon. 
Prevention of False Alarms 
Detection of a fire which could threaten the safety of the 
Skylab crew or the integrity of the vehicle is of rril11e import-
ance. However, a system th;)t developed frequent false 
alarms would callsc severe rroblel11s for the crew and it 
might even h;)ve to be deactivated. Inevitably. a ~ensitive 
device is ;)Iways susceptible to false ;)Iarms unless the alarm-
threshold is set suitably high . To est;)blish the minimum 
level a thorough study of the spacecraft environment was 
undertaken and its effect on the fire sensor was assessed. 
Ultraviulct Rauioltion 
As the ultraviolet fire detector is sensitive to pieowatts of 
emitted radiation, extreme care had to be taken to ensure that 
even very weak background r<!diation sources were eliminated. 
~he ~un is the rrime source of such radiation, but spacecraft 
hghtll1g, photographic lighting, scientific experiments, and 
cIectrostatic discharges are among other possible sources of 
ultraviolet photons. Statistical computations showed that 
the maximum background irradiance that can be tolerated at 
the sensor location is 10- '''w cm -', if the occurrence of false 
alarms is to be less than one per 56-day mission. 
Solar radiation outside the spacecraft includes approxi-
mately 4 >: 1O- 4 w cm-' in the sensitivity range of the fire 
sensor. and data from the OGO IV ultraviolet spectrometer 
indicates that even the Earth's albedo is rich in ultraviolet 
radiationS (Fig. 6). Various window materials are used in 
the Skylab: fused silica, Vycor, Corning ;.~ 1723 alumino-
silicate glass, and Ohara # BK7 borosilicate glass. Fused 
silica and Vycor both transmit a high percentage of incident 
ultraviolet radiation. and spacecraft windows constructed with 
these materials have had to be coated with reflective and 
absorbing films. Blue reflective coatings have been utilized. 
but antireflection coatings and certain environmental control 
co~ltings. deposited to meet other optic;)1 requiremcnts. also 
were found to reduce the ultr;)violet intensity by several orders 
of magnitude. Borosilicate and alumillosilicalc glasses ;Ire 
often thought of .lS "opaque" in the middle uitr;)violet, out 
transmission eurves for one of the Airlock module window 
clements (Fig. 7) show that the use of quo(;)tion marks is 
justified. In the range of interest. below 270nm, the # 7913 
aluminosilicate element would transmit 0.001 % of the energy 
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Fig. 7 Spectral tr:lnsmittancc of the Skylah STS window clements. 
and the a~segNNbled window would attenuate direct solar 
radiation by only six ordas or magnitude. However, as ten 
or de\'cn orders \\el\: needed to pn.:vcnt false .lIarms, this 
window also h'ld to be coated with an attenuating coating. 
Mercury vapor fiuorescl.!nt lamrs arc uscd widcly in the 
Skylah modules, ;Ind it W:lS feared that the strong 253.7nm 
mercury emi~sion linc \. W. ~WWd trigger the detector. However, 
measurements showed that the glass envelope effectively 
absorbs all the ultraviolet radiation. The exreriments to be 
performed by the crew and the photographic lighting were 
also shown to make an insignificant contribution to the ultra-
violet background. 
The time constants of the detection circuit were selected so 
that static discharges will not trigger the alarm system. 
Lastly, the inlcrior surfaces of the Skylab have been studied, 
and, as their ultraviolet reflectivity is less than 10%, the 
radiation absorbed by these surf<lces will further reduce the 
risk of false alarms. 
Particulate Radiation 
During certain orbits, the Skylab will pass through the 
South Atlantic Anomaly in the trapped radiation belts around 
the Earth. Energetic protons and electrons, oscillating along 
spiral paths bctw,-,en the magnetic poles, will intersect some 
five or six of the daily orbits. The resultant proton fluxes 
inside the ~pacecraft wae caleulated for such orbits, with a 
com pUler program hased on published uata." Profiles for 
the most intense fluxes arc illustrated in Fig. 8 
Electrons and protons imringing on the detector tube will 
cause ionization of the gas between the electrodes of the tube. 
The free electrons produecd will be indistinguishable. from 
photoelectrons, gas avalanches will occur, and pulses will be 
"ener:ltcd in the detcctor circuits. The electron energies are 
:uch that a thin layer of fused silica would easily shield the 
sensor against these particles. On the other hand, the proton 
energies range up to 200 Mev. Expaiments on the NASA 
Langley proton synchrocyclotron confirmed that the proton 
fluxes would generate frequent false ;llarms because any 
~hielding Cllnlit:uratiol1 of acccptable weight would still allow 
the countrat\.: to cxce\.:d 150 counts p\.:r sec. The alarm 
thr..:\!lolu could have b\.:cn ~ct above this level, but the per-
formance of the device would have been uegraded for the 
1600.---r---.---.---,---,---, 
N4MMrJJJHJJJ4JJJ~JJ·~~~JJ~ 
- 1200 tJJtJJtJJjtJtJtiDyrJJjJ~ 
I 
u 
~N~rJJJ~~~~TJ~HJ~;J~ N 
I 
E 
:;: 800 r--+--t--t-',-j 
c: 
2 
o 
~ SllrJJJ4JJJ~JJJ;TJt~~._Jtrr_~ 
)( 
:J 
~ 4ll~JJ~JJ~_I~~~~r~JJJy~~r_N 
0 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 
Arbitrary Time (seconds) 
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thc South Atlantic anomaly. 
whole mISSIon, while the high-flux rates will only be experi-
enced for less than 5 % of the time. 
To overcome this problem, a "twin tube" concept was 
developed. One tube will monitor ultraviolet radiation and 
will also be exposed to the proton environment and a second 
"blind" tube will detect only the background proton fluxes. 
The outputs from these sensors, when fed into differential 
circuits, will generate a signal in proportion to the intensity of 
the ultraviolet radiation only. 
Even with the twin tube arrangement, some shielding is 
necessary to reduce the background signals in the detection 
circuits. The diagram of the proposed design in Fig. 9 shows 
the combination of fused silica and copper shielding which will 
exclude protons less energetic than 85 Mev. 
A statistical analysis of the design, based on estimates of 
the particulate fluxes in the Sky lab orbit, has indicated that 
a threshold of 35 counts per sec, and a time constant of one 
second, will preclude more than one false alarm for each 56-day . 
mission. The zero-gravity experiments verified that a detector 
with these settings would be sensitive to very small fires 
ignited up to 3m away. 
Fused Silica 
Window 
Fi\:. 9 Thc Skylab firc dctector. (Fij!urc reproduced by ~rmission 
of Honeywell, Inc.) 
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Skylab Fire-Detection System 
Flight-worthy fire sensors arc now in production and a 
system of 22 sensors is being installed in the componcnt 
modules of the Skylab. The locations of the units were 
selected on the basis of a survey o f the combustible material 
throughout tb! S .. yl:lb and the unl ikely prospect of an ignition 
sou rce nea rby. \Vherever possible the sensors have been 
installed so that there is overbp be tween the 1 :!Oo fiekl-of-view 
of neighboring units. Crew living and working areas, storage 
areas, instrument panels, cooling and life support systems will 
all be monitored. Should a small fire be ignited anywhere 
inside the Skybb, it will quickly be detected and located so 
that prompt action can be taken. 
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